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Abstract
Backdoor attack is a severe security threat to deep neu-
ral networks (DNNs). We envision that, like adversarial
examples, there will be a cat-and-mouse game for back-
door attacks, i.e., new empirical defenses are developed to
defend against backdoor attacks but they are soon broken
by strong adaptive backdoor attacks. To prevent such cat-
and-mouse game, we take the first step towards certified de-
fenses against backdoor attacks. Specifically, in this work,
we study the feasibility and effectiveness of certifying ro-
bustness against backdoor attacks using a recent technique
called randomized smoothing. Randomized smoothing was
originally developed to certify robustness against adversar-
ial examples. We generalize randomized smoothing to de-
fend against backdoor attacks. Our results show the theo-
retical feasibility of using randomized smoothing to certify
robustness against backdoor attacks. However, we also find
that existing randomized smoothing methods have limited
effectiveness at defending against backdoor attacks, which
highlight the needs of new theory and methods to certify ro-
bustness against backdoor attacks.
1. Introduction
Backdoor attack [6, 21, 11, 27] is a severe security threat
to DNNs. Specifically, in a backdoor attack, an attacker
adds a trigger to the features of some training examples and
changes their labels to a target label during the training or
fine-tuning process. Then, when the attacker adds the same
trigger to the features of a testing example, the learnt classi-
fier predicts the target label for the testing example with the
trigger. We envision that, like adversarial examples, there
will be a cat-and-mouse game for backdoor attacks. In-
deed, various empirical defenses [4, 7, 9, 5, 23, 26, 20] have
been proposed to defend against backdoor attacks in the past
few years. For instance, Neural Cleanse [26] aims to detect
and reconstruct the trigger via solving an optimization prob-
lem. However, [12] showed that Neural Cleanse fails to de-
tect the trigger when the trigger has different sizes, shapes,
and/or locations.
To prevent such cat-and-mouse game, we take the first
step towards certifying robustness against backdoor attacks.
Specifically, we study the feasibility and effectiveness of
certifying robustness against backdoor attacks using ran-
domized smoothing [2, 8, 17, 14]. Randomized smooth-
ing was originally developed to certify robustness against
adversarial examples [25, 10, 3]. In particular, Cao and
Gong [2] is the first to propose randomized smoothing as
an empirical defense against adversarial examples (they
call it region-based classification). Cohen et al. [8] de-
rived a tight certified robustness guarantee for randomized
smoothing with Gaussian noise using the Neyman-Pearson
Lemma [22]. Lee et al. [17] and Jia et al. [14] generalized
randomized smoothing to discrete data using discrete noise
distribution.
In this work, we generalize randomized smoothing to de-
fend against backdoor attacks. Given an arbitrary function
(we call it base function), which takes a data vector as an
input and outputs a label, randomized smoothing can turn
the function to be a provably robust one via adding ran-
dom noise to the input data vector. Specifically, a function
is provably robust if it outputs the same label for all data
points in a region (e.g., `p-norm ball) around an input. Our
idea to certify robustness against backdoor attacks consists
of two steps. First, we view the entire process of learning a
classifier from the training dataset and using the classifier to
make predictions for a testing example as a base function.
In particular, this base function takes a training dataset and
a testing example as an input, and the base function out-
puts a predicted label for the testing example. Second, we
add random noise to the training dataset and a testing exam-
ple to overwhelm the trigger that the attacker injects to the
training examples and the testing example.
We evaluate our method on a subset of the MNIST
dataset. Our defense guarantees that 36% of testing images
can be classified correctly when an attacker arbitrarily per-
turbs at most 2 pixels/labels of the training examples and
pixels of a testing example. Our results show the theoretical
feasibility of using randomized smoothing to certify robust-
ness against backdoor attacks. However, our results also
show that existing randomized smoothing methods with ad-
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ditive noise have limited effectiveness at defending against
backdoor attacks. Our study highlights the needs of new
theory and techniques to certify robustness against back-
door attacks.
2. Background on Randomized Smoothing
Randomized smoothing is state-of-the-art technique to
certify the robustness of a classifier against adversarial ex-
amples. Randomized smoothing [2, 19] was first proposed
as an empirical defense against adversarial examples. For
instance, Cao and Gong [2] proposed to add uniform ran-
dom noise from a hypercube centered at a testing example
and use majority vote to smooth the predicted label of the
testing example. They called the method region-based clas-
sification as it leverages information in a region around a
testing example to predict its label. Lecuyer et al. [16]
derived the first certified robustness guarantee for random-
ized smoothing using differential privacy techniques. Li et
al. [18] derived a tighter certified robustness guarantee us-
ing information-theoretic techniques. Cohen et al. [8] de-
rived a tight certified robustness guarantee for randomized
smoothing with Gaussian noise using the Neyman-Pearson
Lemma [22]. Jia et al. [13] derived a tight certified robust-
ness guarantee of general top-k predictions for randomized
smoothing with Gaussian noise. Lee et al. [17] and Jia et
al. [14] generalized randomized smoothing to discrete data
using discrete noise. We will use such randomized smooth-
ing for discrete data because labels are discrete/categorical.
Salman et al. [24] and Zhai et al. [28] proposed methods to
train classifiers that have better certified robustness under
randomized smoothing.
Next, we describe randomized smoothing from a general
function perspective, making it easier to understand how we
apply randomized smoothing to certify robustness against
backdoor attacks.
2.1. Building a Smoothed Function
Data vector v: Suppose we have a data vector v. We
consider each dimension of v to be discrete, as many ap-
plications have discrete data, e.g., pixel values are discrete.
Moreover, when certifying robustness against backdoor at-
tacks, some dimensions of v correspond to the labels of the
training examples, which are discrete. Without loss of gen-
erality, we assume each dimension of v is from the discrete
domain {0, 1d , · · · , d−1d }, where d is the domain size. We
note that randomized smoothing could also be applied when
the dimensions of v have different domain sizes. However,
for simplicity, we assume the dimensions have the same do-
main size.
Base function: Suppose we have an arbitrary function (we
call it base function), which takes the data vector v as an
input and outputs a label in a set {0, 1, · · · , c − 1}. For
instance, when certifying robustness against adversarial ex-
amples, the base function is a classifier whose robustness
we aim to certify. When certifying robustness against back-
door attacks, we treat the entire process of learning a classi-
fier and using the learnt classifier to make predictions for a
testing example as a base function. For convenience, we de-
note the base function as f , and f(v) is the predicted label
for v.
Adversarial perturbation: An attacker can perturb the
data vector v. We denote by δ the adversarial perturba-
tion an attacker adds to the vector v, where δj is the per-
turbation added to the jth dimension of the vector v and
δj ∈ {0, 1d , · · · , d−1d }. Moreover, we denote by v ⊕ δ the
perturbed data vector, where the operator ⊕ is defined for
each dimension as follows:
vj ⊕ δj = (vj · d+ δj · d) mod d
d
, (1)
where vj and δj are the jth dimensions of the vector v
and the perturbation vector δ, respectively. We measure the
magnitude of the adversarial perturbation using its `0 norm,
i.e., ||δ||0. We adopt `0 norm because it is semantically easy
to interpret. In particular, `0 norm of the adversarial pertur-
bation is the number of dimensions of v that are arbitrarily
perturbed by the attacker.
Smoothed function: Randomized smoothing builds a new
function from the base function via adding random noise to
the data vector v. We call the new function smoothed func-
tion. Specifically, we denote by  the random noise vector,
where the jth dimension j ∈ {0, 1d , · · · , d−1d } is the ran-
dom noise added to vj . We consider j has the following
distribution [17, 14]:
Pr(j = 0) = β,
Pr(j = t) = θ =
1− β
d− 1 , ∀t ∈ {
1
d
,
2
d
, · · · , d− 1
d
}. (2)
Moreover, v⊕  is the noisy data vector, where the operator
⊕ is defined in Equation 1. The noise distribution indicates
that, when adding a random noise vector  to the data vector
v, the jth dimension of v is preserved with a probability β
and is changed to any other value with a probability 1−βd−1 .
Since we add random noise to the data vector v, the base
function f outputs a random label. We define a smoothed
function g, which outputs the label with the largest proba-
bility as follows:
g(v) = argmax
y∈{0,1,··· ,c−1}
Pr(f(v ⊕ ) = y), (3)
where g(v) is the label predicted for v by the smoothed
function. Note that g(v ⊕ δ) is the label predicted for the
perturbed data vector v ⊕ δ.
2.2. Computing Certified Radius
Randomized smoothing guarantees that the smoothed
function g predicts the same label when the adversarial per-
turbation δ is bounded. In particular, according to [17], we
have:
g(v ⊕ δ) = l, ∀||δ||0 ≤ R(pl), (4)
where pl ≤ Pr(f(v⊕ ) = l) is a lower bound of the proba-
bility Pr(f(v⊕ ) = l) that f predicts a label l when adding
random noise  to v, and R(pl) is called certified radius.
Intuitively, Equation 4 shows that the smoothed function g
predicts the same label l when an attacker arbitrarily per-
turbs at most R(pl) dimensions of the data vector v. Note
that the certified radius R(pl) depends on pl. In particular,
given any lower bound pl, we can compute the certified ra-
dius R(pl). The computation details can be found in [17].
Estimating a lower bound pl is the key to compute the cer-
tified radius. Next, we describe how to estimate pl.
Cohen et al. [8] proposed a Monte Carlo method to pre-
dict l and estimate pl with probabilistic guarantees. Specif-
ically, we sample N noise 1, 2, · · · , N from the noise
distribution defined in Equation 2. We compute the label
f(v ⊕ j) for each noise j , and we compute the label
frequency count[i] =
∑N
j=1 I(f(v ⊕ j) = i) for each
i ∈ {0, 1, · · · , c − 1}, where I is an indicator function.
The smoothed function g outputs the label l with the largest
frequency. Moreover, Cohen et al. [8] proposed to use the
Clopper-Pearson method [1] to estimate pl as follows:
pl = B(α; count[l], N − count[l] + 1), (5)
where 1 − α is the confidence level and B(α; a, b) is the
αth quantile of the Beta distribution with shape parameters
a and b.
3. Certifying Robustness against Backdoor At-
tacks
Suppose we have a training dataset {X,y} =
{(x1, y1), (x2, y2), · · · , (xT , yT )}, where xi and yi are the
feature vector and label of the ith training example, respec-
tively. Suppose further we have a learning algorithm A
which takes the training dataset as an input and produces
a classifier h, i.e., h = A(X,y). We use the classifier h
to predict the label for a testing example x. We generalize
randomized smoothing to certify robustness against back-
door attacks. Our key idea is to combine the entire process
of training and prediction as a single function f(X,y, x),
which is the predicted label for a testing example x when
the classifier is trained on {X,y} using the algorithm A.
We view the function f as a base function and apply ran-
domized smoothing to it.
Constructing a smoothed function: We view the concate-
nation of the feature matrix X, the label vector y, and the
features of the testing example x as the data vector v that we
described in Section 2. We add a random noise matrix τ to
the feature matrix X, where each entry of the noise matrix
is drawn from the distribution defined in Equation 2 with d
as the feature domain size. We add a random noise vector
 to the label vector y, where each entry of the noise vector
is drawn from the distribution defined in Equation 2 with
d = c. Furthermore, we add a random noise vector γ to
the testing example x, where each entry of the noise vector
is drawn from the distribution defined in Equation 2 with d
as the feature domain size. Since we add random noise, the
output of the base function f is also random. The smoothed
function g outputs the label that has the largest probability.
Formally, we have:
g(X,y, x) = argmax
y∈{0,1,··· ,c−1}
Pr(f(X⊕ τ,y ⊕ , x⊕ γ) = y),
(6)
where g(X,y, x) is the label predicted by the smoothed
function for x.
Computing the certified radius: We denote by a matrix δ1
and a vector δ2 the perturbations an attacker adds to the fea-
ture matrix X and label vector y, respectively. Moreover,
we denote by a vector δ3 the adversarial perturbation an at-
tacker adds to the testing example x. Based on Equation 4,
we have the following:
g(X⊕ δ1,y ⊕ δ2, x⊕ δ3) = l,
∀||δ1||0 + ||δ2||0 + ||δ3||0 ≤ R(pl),
(7)
where pl ≤ Pr(f(X ⊕ τ,y ⊕ , x ⊕ γ) = l). Equation 7
means that the smoothed function g predicts the same la-
bel for the testing example x when the `0 norm of the ad-
versarial perturbation added to the feature matrix and label
vector of the training examples as well as the testing exam-
ple is bounded by R(pl). The key to computing the certi-
fied radius R(pl) is to estimate pl. We use the Monte Carlo
method described in Section 2 to estimate pl. Specifically,
we randomly sample N noise matrices τ1, τ2, · · · , τN , N
noise vectors 1, 2, · · · , N , as well as N noise vectors
γ1, γ2, · · · , γN . We train N classifiers, where the jth clas-
sifier hj is trained using the training dataset (X⊕τ j ,y⊕j)
and learning algorithmA. Then, we compute the frequency
of each label i, i.e., Ni =
∑N
j=1 I(f(X ⊕ τ j ,y ⊕ j , x ⊕
γj) = i)=
∑N
j=1 I(h(x⊕γj) = i) for i ∈ {0, 1, · · · , c−1}.
Finally, we can estimate pl using Equation 5. Note that
the trained N classifiers can be re-used to predict the la-
bels and compute certified radius for different testing ex-
amples. Moreover, via evenly dividing α among the testing
examples, we can obtain a simultaneous confidence level of
1− α for the estimated certified radius of the testing exam-
ples based on the Bonferroni Correction.
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Figure 1. Certified accuracy of our method against backdoor at-
tacks on MNIST 1/7.
4. Experimental Results
Experimental setup: We use a subset of the MNIST
dataset [15] which only contains the handwritten digits ”1”
and ”7” and is used for binary classification. Each digit im-
age has a size 28∗28 and has normalized pixel values within
{0, 1/255, 2/255, · · · , 1}. For simplicity, we binarize the
pixel values in our experiment. Specifically, if a pixel value
is smaller than 0.5, we set it to be 0, otherwise we set it to be
1. Moreover, we randomly select 100 digits from the subset
of the MNIST dataset to form the training dataset and ran-
domly select another 1,000 digits as the testing examples.
We use a two-layer neural network as the classifier.
Evaluation metric: We use certified accuracy as an eval-
uation metric. Specifically, for a given number of per-
turbed pixels/labels, certified accuracy is the fraction of
testing examples, whose labels are correctly predicted by
the smoothed function and whose certified radiuses are no
smaller than the given number of perturbed pixels/labels.
Experimental results: Figure 1 shows the certified accu-
racy of our method against backdoor attacks with β = 0.9,
N = 10, 000, and 1− α = 99.9%. Our method guarantees
that 36% of testing images can be classified correctly when
an attacker arbitrarily perturbs at most 2 pixels/labels of the
training examples and pixels of a testing example.
5. Conclusion
In this work, we take the first step towards certified de-
fenses against backdoor attacks. In particular, we study the
feasibility and effectiveness of certifying robustness against
backdoor attacks via randomized smoothing, which was
originally developed to certify robustness against adversar-
ial examples. Our method has two key steps. First, we treat
the entire process of training a classifier and using the clas-
sifier to predict the label of a testing example as a base func-
tion. Second, we add noise to the training data and a testing
example to overwhelm the perturbation an attacker adds in a
backdoor attack. Our results on a subset of MNIST demon-
strate that it is theoretically feasible to certify robustness
against backdoor attacks using randomized smoothing, but
existing randomized smoothing methods have limited effec-
tiveness. Our study highlights the needs of new techniques
to certify robustness against backdoor attacks.
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